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UNDERFUNDED PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
PENSION PLANS: SCOPE OF Tl-IE PROBLEM
IN THE SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST
K.K. Raman and Sharon H. Garrison

The objective of this article is to ,hcd some light on the problem of underfunded State and local government employee pen~ion plans. In particular,
we examine the underfunding stallls of State-local pen~ion plans in the South
and Southwest relative to the rest of the United States.
State and local government pension plan~ arc exempt from the funding
and other major rrovi5ions of the Employee Rctirl·rncnt Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA). Perhaps for thi, reason, many State and local government
pension plans are not setting aside sufficient fund~ to provide for estimated
future benefits. In a survey of 72 go,ernmcntal pension plans, the General
Accounting Office (GAO, 1979) found that billions of dollars in unfunded
liabilitie, had been accumulated, and that 53 of thc~e plam ,,ere not recei1ing large enough contributions to satisfy the funding standards of ERISA.
The GAO reported that compliance ,,ith ERIS/\ ,,ould require annual contributions in many plans to more than double. Also, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACI R, 1980) reported that the average
asset-to-accrued liability ratio for all State-local plan, 11 as in the -15 10 50
percent range, and that many individual State and local retirement s},tcm1
appeared to be facing potentially ~erious funding problem,.
It could be argued that full funding of public pension~ is unnecessary, since
governments have perpetual life and the po1,er to tax. Yet, a, Tilo\C~ (1976)
points out. governmental units arc hedged in by ,tatutory lirni1' on ta,ation
and debt, and in the event of a taxpayer's re\olt or a ~eriou~ disloeation in
the economy, may find it impossible to finance their pension plans. Morco1cr.
if it is difficult to appropriate enough money to adequately fund pemion
plans now, why should it be any easier in the future? Tilme ,uggem that
funding may be ncce~~ary for the sake of se.:urity ;111d to n:a"urc the
beneficiaries. Interestingly. Ehrenberg and Smith ( 1981 l report that public
employees perceive u nfunded pension promises a\ being quite risky and demand some degree of compemation in the form of higher \\ages for the ris~
that comes from underfunding.
The underfunding of State-loeal pensions is aho an important public policy
issue, since underfunding may lead to intergenerational inequities if a future
generation of taxpayers have to pay for these liabilities. In a competitive po·
litical environment, it may be only too tempting for public officiab to increase their reelection chances by promising employees liberal pension benefits
without having to raise eurrcnt taxes. II has also been \Uggcstcd by Feldstein
and Seligman (1981) that underfunded pensions may result in lower national savings and capital accumulation if employees reduce rheir savings in anticipation of receiving pension benefits.
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Accounting for Pcm,ion Costs
The State-local pension underfunding problem may have been aggravated
by the fact that , unlike corporate accounting. State-local_ government acco~nting is not subject to Securities a nd Exchange Comm1_ss1on (SEC) regulation.
Under the U.S. Constitution, the States are the sovereign and superior governmental entities for the geographic area, they encompa~~. The State, thu~ pmsess the legal authority to prescribe accounting practices for t hemseh e, and
for local governments. A recent survey by the Council of State Government s
(C0SG, 1980) reported many departures from GAAP (generally accepted
accounting principles) in State accounting and reporting practices. In particular, it reported that only 28 State, determine their pen~ion costs on an
actuarial basis. while the remaining 22 States are on a pay-as-you-go basi~.
Pay-as-you-go basis implies that annual appropriations arc sufficient just
to meet the pension plan's current benefit payments. Deficiencies in accounting and reporting practices also exist for local governments. In a recent survey. Engmom ( 1984) found that only 59 percent of a sample of dtie~
possessing the MFOA Certifil.:ate of Conformance reported the amount of
unfunded pension obligations. f 11 Only a tiny fraction of all the go, em mental units in the U.S. possess the MFOA Certificate. Detailed e~timates of
unfunded pension liabilities for most governmental unit, is generally not available except in two or three ~t atc, (e.g., Pennsylvania) where local go,ernme1m are required 10 report ~uch information by the Staie government.
Given the unavailability of data on unfunded pension liabilitie~ . ...,e utilized two financial ratio~ that are considered to be correlates of pension fund
underfunding. Information on these ratio, are a,·ailable from the Bureau
of Ccn~u,. Our objective \\a, to l!xamine the underfunding , tatu, of Statelocal pcn~ion plan~ in the South and Soutll\\e~t relative to the rest of the
country.

[he• Stud,

In a report on citic~ in financial di~tre,~. the ,\C IR (1973) indicated that
iwo financial ratios for pension plam may be helpful in e, aluating the exlent of underfunding. The,e, ariable, are I) the ratio of current pension fund
assets to current annual pension fund benefit payment\ (PAPB), and 2) the
ratio of current annual pension fund contributions to current annual pen\ion fund henefit paymenh (PCPB). The ACIR ,ugge,ted that a ,ubstantial
deviation in these ratios from the national average, may indicat e a ~eriom
underfunding problem.
Subsequently. Ehrenberg ( 1980) developed a t heoretieal model of a public
sector retirement sy~tern. Thi\ model seeh t o measure the degree of pen,ion
fund underfunding a s a function of a number of "ob,enable correlates"
~hat can be computed for retirement system~. Ehrenberg reports that hi, model
is robust and that in hi~ own and other empirical research on public sector
l~bor markets, these correlates "perform" a~ satisfactory proxies for pension underfunding. Two of these observable correlates are financial ratios
- PAPB and PCPll.
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As stated earlier, data on unfunded pen~ion liahilitics for most State-local
governments arc not available. However, data required to calculate the ratios PAPB and PCPB arc available from the Bureau of Census' 1982 Census of Governments. These data arc available for plans administered by local
governments and for State administered plans rat her than just for State employees. While data for State employees only "ould have been preferable, 1
they are simply not available. However, there are two advantages to the data
for State administered plans. The first is that State administered plans contain about 90 percent of all State and local pension participants (ACIR, 1980.
p.7) and thus are more comprehensive than locally administered plans which ,
may include only a \mall fraction of local employee~. The ,econd advantage
is that reporting and disclo,ure requirements for State administered plans
are extensive and hence data ma} be more reliable (ACI R, 1980, p.7). Also,
local government officials belie11e that if the States were to mandate funding
and other reforms, the States should also pay for these reforms (GAO, 1979,
p.35). Hence, the State\ may be ~aid to bear ultimate re,ponsibility for the 1
fiscal heahh of State admini,tercd plans.
The Bureau of Census divide~ the South and Southwest into three geographic regions - We,t South Central (consi,ting of Oklahoma, Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas), East South Central (consisting of Kentucky, Tennessee,
Mis\is\ippi and Alabama}, and South Atlantic (consisting of Delaware.
Maryland, \\'est Virginia. Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Florida). Table-I presents the U.S. and regional 11alues for the 111,0
pen,ion ratios. Based on the U.S. average~. State administered plans appear
to be in better financial shape than plans administered by local governments.
(Note that the higher the ratios, the bener the lunding position.} This is generally to be expected, since States typically ha\e better acce,s to resources than
local governments. State administered plans in the three regions appear to
be as "ell funded (or underfunded) as the national average. However, plans
administered by local government, in the three regions appear to be in a better po,ition than ,imilar plam elsewhere. Thi'> may reflect the less generous
pension benefit, in the South and Southwest, as well as the greater financial
strength (and fiscal conservatism) of these local governments. Nevertheless,
it \'.ould appear that unfunded pension liabilities are as much a fact of life
in the South and Southv.est as in other parts of the country.
We aho utilized an alternate methodology ror estimating the burden of
underlunded pensions in the South and Southwest. Recently, Mark~ and Raman (I 984) investigated the following model:
F

1

= a0 · (PAPB/ · (PCPB)a

2

In the above model, the independent ,ariables PAPB and PCPB have been
shown by Ehrenberg ( 1980) to be theoretical correlates of pension under•
funding. The dependent variable is a direct measure of underfunding. Since
the amount of underfunding may be expected to be associated with the size

r
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TABLE l
pension Ratios:
A,

Pension Plans Administered
by State Governments

*PAPB
PCPB
8.

U.S. and Regional Averages

14. 34
2.82

West
South
Central

East
South
Central

12.02
2.70

14. 33
3.1 2

South
Atlantic

13. 42
2. 78

Pension Plans Administered

by Local Governments

u .s.
*PAPB
PCPB

10. 83
2.30

We st
South
Central

12.28
3. 14

East
So uth
Central

12-07
2.98

south
Atlantic

11. 72
2.49

*PAPB - Ratio of current pension fund assets to current
annual pension Eund benefit payments
PCPB - Ratio of current annual pension fund contributions to
current annual pension fund benefit payments
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of the govcrnmcn1al unit, the dependent ,ariable Fis the amount of unfunded
pension liabilities scaled by pormlation. (21 l\lark, and Raman ( 1984) estimated the model using data from the Act 293 Report of the Public Employee
Retirement Study Commission of the State of Penmylvania. This Act require~ the commis,ion to collect certain financial data (im:luding unfunded
obligations) for all the public employee pemion plan~ in Pennsylvania (31.
Although the mo<lel is non-linear, it \,a, eMimatcd by ordinary least-squares
(OLS) regression analysis after recasting the equation in the log-linear form
(tal-ing the natural logarithm of both side~ of the equation). While the R·
did not exceed 0.33, both \'ariabk, l',\PB an<l l'CPB and the comtant (aO) ,
\\ere statistically significant. Assumption~ of OLS regression, i.e.,
homoscedasticity and normality of residuals were ,atisfied. In this article we
me the estimates of the con\tant (a0) and the coefficients of PAPB and PCPB
to measure the amount of unfunded pensions liabilities per capita. These estimates are reported in Tablc-2. The national average is $9.36 per capita for
State admini,tered plans and $ I I. 7-l for locally admini5tered plans. There
is considerable \ariation in the e~timated per capita burden among the differ•
ent State, in the South and Southwest. Note that the per capita estimate of
unfunded pensions for State admini'>!ered plan~ will he borne by all residents
of the State, 1, hik the per capita c,timate for locally admini,tered plam will
be borne by resident\ of only tho,e loL·al go~crnment ,.
Summar) and Condm,ions

There is 50rnc evidence: (GAO, 1979: /\CIR, 1980) that public c:rnployee
pcn,ion plam arc seriously undcrfunde<l. Unfunded pcn,ions rai~e irnpor•
tam public policy is~ues in term\ of intergenerational equities (Tilove, 1976)
and the impact on national savings (Fcld5tein and Seligman, 1981 ). Morc01er,
since unfunded obligation~ represent potential claims on the ca,h flows of
the governmental unic, they may be expected to have an impact on propert)
values (Epple and Schipper, 1980) and creditor decision, (r-.1,irl-, and Ra•
man. 1985).
Since State-local government accounting is not ~ubject to Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation, detailed estimates of unfunded liabilities for State-local governrno;:nt, is generally not available. We therefore
relied on a theoretical model by Ehrenberg (1980) to ,elect two financial ra·
cios that arc "correlaces" of underfunding. Thc~c correlate, \\ere used to
estimate the: burden of underfunding in the South and Southwo;:st. On aver·
age, the underfunded pen~ion liability problem seem, to he as severe in the
South and the Southwest as in the rest of the U.S., though there are con~iderable \ariations among the.: State~ in the region. Howc\\:r, lon1lly ad·
ministered plam in the South anJ Southwest generally appear to be in a
stronger position than similar plan~ elsewhere, reflecting perhaps the great·
er financ:ial strength (and fi~cal conso;:rvatism) of these local governments.
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TABLE 2
Model Estimates of Unfunded Pension
Liabilities Per Capita
State
Administered
Plans

s

Locally
Administered
Plans

9 . 36

$11. 74

West South Central
Oklahoma
Texas
Louisiana
Arkansas

10.47
10. 56
9 . 19
l 5. 31
8 . 70

9.81
7.28
8. 50
15. 34
13. 00

East South Central
Kentucky
Tennessee
Mississippi
Alabama

9.04
10. 32
8.43
9.33
8.40

10.08
8.92
10.27
18. 20
9.26

South Atlantic
Delaware
~aryland
West Virginia
Viq inia
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida

9.76
7 .4 7
13. 01
1 7 . 21
10.76
8.90
7.80
9.03
8 . 59

10.93
18.67
9.37
22.48
9.39
7 . 57
8.86
16 . 28
13. 32

United States
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FOOTNOTES
[I.) The Municipal Finance Officers Association (MFOA) has a voluntary
program for compliance with generally accepted accounting principles '
(GAAP). Governmental units meeting most of the GAAP requirements
are awarded the Certificate of Conformance.

(2.) We believe that this is an approprate way of calculating the burden or
unfunded pensions. The literature on municipal bonds (Lamb and Rap.
paport, 1980; PSA, 1981), for example, states that bonded debt per
capita is an important variable in general obligation credit analysis.
While unfunded pension liabilities are not bonded debt, they do
represent potential claim, on the future ca~h flow\ of the governmen•
ta! unit.
[3.) The importance of Pennsylvania's Act 293 data has been demonstrat•

ed by Ehrenberg and Smith ( 1981) and Epple and Schipper (1981) in
the context of research in the labor and housing markets, respectively.
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